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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------

STATE OF' UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18987

JAY RICHARD NEWTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from a conviction of forgery, a second degree
felony,

in violation of

76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953

(as amended), before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
Judge, in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was found guilty of forgery, a
second-degree felony,

in violation of Utah Code Annotated

76-6-501, 1953 (as amended).

He appeals from the denial of

his motion to suppress evidence.

__

__

Appellant was charged with forgery, a second-degree
felony, and theft, a third degree felony.

On January 14,

1983, appellant made a motion to suppress evidence.

The

motion was denied by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third
District Judge.

Appellant was subsequently convicted of

forgery.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the convict ion in
the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 20, 1982, Jim Clark, the front-end
manager for Ream's Bargain Annex located at 70675 South 7th
East,

(transcript of January 24, 1983, hereinafter T., p.4)

cashed a check for an individual.

The check was made payable

to Robert Lynn Frear in the amount of $397.43 and was drawn on
the account of Peck

Peck, a painting company (T. 44).

&

Following standard procedure, Clark wrote the individual's
social security number, driver's license number, and birth
date on the back of the check (T. 46).

Later, however, Clark

testified that he could not describe the individual who had
given him the check because the time he had spent with him
was so brief (T. 46)
valley Bank stopped payment on the check because the
signature on it was improperly written (T. 15).
discovered that Peck
the check ( T. 14).

&

It was then

Peck did not authorize the issuance of

Furthermore, Robert Lynn Frear had never

received the check (T. 17).
Frear explained that he had lost his driver's
license in the summer of 1981.

He did not worry about it,
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however, because it had expired and was therefore invalid (T.
18).
Frear also stated that the social security number on
the forged check was his (T. 21).

He testified further that

he was acquainted with the appellant

(T. 19).

Detective George Sinclair arrested appellant on
January 19, 1982, on the charge of aggravated burglary (T. 40,
Hearing of January 14, 1983, hereinafter H., P.

10)

Sinclair

discovered in appellant's possession a Capital City Bank
account card issued under the name of Robert Lynn Frear (T.
36).

Appellant was incarcerated after this arrest (T. 41).
On February 18, 1982, Dennis Holm of Adult Probation

and Parole went to investigate a shooting at the residence of
Debbie and Leon Smith (T. 29).
the state prison (T. 26).

Leon Smith was on parole from

During the investigation, Holm

found Frear's lost driver's license in one of Smith's folders
which contained other drivers' licenses, social security
cards, and blank checks.
been cut

Frear's photograph had

from his 1981 license and replaced by appellant's

photograph.
( T.

(T. 28).

Appellant's photograph had been taped into place.

37).

Albert Nortz, a Sandy City Police officer, was
investigating the suspected forged check (T. 61).

He

telephoned Sgt. Sinclair and informed him that the appellant
was a good suspect

(H. 4).

With the knowlege linking appellant to the Frear
bank account card and driver's license but without a search
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warrant, Nortz interviewed appellant

who was already in the

Salt Lake County Jail (T. 56) on April 14, 1982.

Appellant

had been incarcerated for three months at the time of the
interview (T. 40, 56).

Detective Nortz, prior to questionin'J,

advised appellant of his
Miranda card.

(H. 6, T. 57).

rights by reading from a
Appellant acknowledged that he

understood those rights and stated that he would be willing to
talk with Detective Nortz without having an attorney present
( H. 6).

Appellant made no effort to cont act an attorney ( H.

5), although he had been represented by an attorney three
months earlier on the unrelated charge (H. 10, 11).

Having

obtained appellant's approval to continue the interview,
Detective Nortz showed him two checks, one of which was the
"Peck" check (T. 6) with Robert Frear as the designated payee.
Appellant claimed to know nothing about them (H. 6).

Nortz

asked appellant if he minded filling out a handwriting specimen.

He explained to appellant that it was for comparison

purposes (H. 7).

Nortz also told appellant that he had a

right to refuse to ( H. 8) cooperate.

Appellant, however, said

he had nothing to hide and provided the handwiting sample.

(H.

8)

Both the suspected forged "Peck" check and appellant's handwriting exemplar were sent to a handwriting
expert at the State of Utah Crime Laboratory H. 9, T. 60).
The expert testified that the same person had authored both
the signature on the "Peck" check made out to Robert Frear and
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appellant's handwriting exemplar.
It

appears that appellant had obtained Frear's

driver's license and social security number and used them to
forge a detective signature and cash a check made out to
Frear.

He altered the driver's license, replacing Frear's

picture with his own (T. 20), and changed the expiration date
to 1982 (T. 24).
Following a bench trial, appellant was found guilty
of forgery.

He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an

indeterminate sentence of one to five years (T. 49).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY
WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA.
Appellant contends that he was denied his right to
counsel because counsel was not present during the police
interrogation of the forgery charge against him.

Appellant

makes this contention in spite of the fact that he was given a
warning and voluntarily and intelligently consented to
the interrogation.
At the out set , it is import ant to note that several
factors distinguish the instant case from mere right to counsel analysis.

These facts are that first, appellant had ob-

tained counsel three months earlier for an unrelated
aggravated robbery charge;

(H.10) and second, that it had been
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three months since the last unrelated interr°']iltion.
in both the time and subject matter of the
demonstrates that the

This ')ap

laler interrogation

issue in this case cannot be properly

framed simply as a right to counsel problem.

Recause of these

unique circumstances, the issue is rather the larger problem
of whether appellant did in fact voluntarily and knowingly
waive his

rights, including his right to counsel,

prior to the separate and distinct forgery interrogation.
The record is clear that appellant affirmatively
waived both his right to counsel and his right to remain silent after Detective Nortz informed him of his rights.
recent Supreme Court case of

The

_ _':._·__M_osl_e_z, 423 U.S. 96,

96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) is factually very similar to the instant
case and is controlling of the issue.

In both !'1_o_s_l:_ey and the

instant case, the defendants were initially arrested on one
charge,

interrogated about it, and then later questioned about

another unrelated offense following the readmonition of
Miranda.

They are dissimilar, however, in that in

the

interval between the unrelated interrogations was only two
hours whereas in the instant case, the interval between the
two interrogations was three months.

Also, the defendant

in

Mosley never saw an attorney in relation to the first,
unrelated charge; while in the instant case, appellant saw an
attorney for the first charge, but did not ask to see him on
the unrelated charge three months later.
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The Supreme Court

in

said that it was clearly

impermissible for the police to continue interrogation after
only a momentary cessation, it added that to impose a blanket
prohibit ion a0ainst the taking of voluntary statements,
re0ardless of the circumstances, "would transform the
safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate
police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an
opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of
their

interests."

.!_'!_. at 102. The

Court then stated

Clearly, therefore, neither this passage
nor any other passage in the Miranda
opinion can sensibly be read
a
per se proscription of indefinite duration
upon any further questioning by any police
officer on any subject, once the person in
custody has indicated a desire to remain
silent.
Id. at 102-103. (Footnote
omitted)
The Court then explained that the most critical inquiry is
whether the person's right to cut off questioning was
"scrupulously honored" by the police.

Id. This respect for

the person's rights does not mean, however, that once that
person has indicated a desire to remain silent, further
inter rog at ion may resume only when counsel is present .
104 (footnote 10).

The Court in

Id. at

then found, following

a review of the circumstances, that the defendant's right to
cut off questioning was fully respected.
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In the instant case, appellant's right to cut off
questioning was scrupulously honored following his invocation
of the right to counsel during the course of the first
interrogation on the unrelated burglary charge.

Three months

later, pursuant to legitimate investigative action,
questioning on a different matter occurred.

This separate ano

distinct interrogation was preceded by a

warning, ano

only upon receipt of the new warning did appellant voluntarily
and intelligently consent to the questioning.
Appellant affirmatively waived his right to remain
silent by agreeing to speak with Detective Nortz.

In

addition, appellant waived his right to have an attorney
present by acknowledging that he understood his

rights

and that there was no need for him to contact an attorney.
Appellant then explained that he "had nothing to hide"

(H. 8)

and demonstrated his willingness to cooperate at this
custodial interrogation.
The test for whether the waiver of a right
was formulated

in

304 U.S.

458, 464 ( 1938):

"A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.
The determination of
whether there has been an intelligent
waiver • . • must depend, in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
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is valio

In the instant case, the circumstances clearly demonstrate
that appellant knowingly and intentionally relinquished his
right to have an attorney present.

Appellant did not request

an attorney after being reinformed of this right by Detective
Nortz.

He cannot complain of the failure to have an attorney

present when counsel's absence during this particular
custodial
choice.

interrogation was the product of his own informed
This allowance for a subsequent waiver of the right

to counsel is supported by the recent case of
463 A.2d 876 (Md.Ct. Spec. App. 1983).

In

the

defendant made incriminating statements in response to police
initiated questioning despite his earlier invocation of the
right to counsel the previous day during custodial
interrogation about an unrelated crime.

The defendant,

Offutt, was arrested for burglary and was taken to the
Montgomery County Detention Center.
question him.

Afte being given a

The police attempted to
warning, however,

the defendant invoked his right to consult with an attorney.
The first

interrcxiat ion of the defendant was then terminated.
The second interrogation of Offutt on the unrelated

charges occurred when a detective, who was not
first

involved in the

interrogation, met with the defendant, thirty hours

after the first questioning, during which time the defendant
had invoked his right to cousel.

Id. at 881, the detective on

this second occasion told the defendant that he faced further
charges on additional burglaries and then issued the
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warning.

The defendant then affirmatively stated that he did

not want a lawyer during this second inter rO<Jat ion and gave an
inculpatory statement.

Id. at 882.

Offutt contended that the aclmission of this
statement

into evidence violated his rights under

__v_._

384 U.S. 436 (1966), as interpreted by
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).

The court

held, however, that
case before it.

in

was inapplicable to the

Since Edwards was factually dissimilar from

Offutt inasmuch as

focused upon a single investigation

of a single crime and did not address the Offutt circumstance
of two separate police investigation of two separate crimes.
Id. at 880.

The Offutt court then observed:

It is Michigan v. Mosely that
controls that-phenomen0r1l"nvolving
separate investigations of separate
crimes. The appellant seeks to slip out
from under the controlling authority of
Michigan v. Mosley by pointing out that
the specific right invoked in the initial
int e rrog at ion in Michigan v. Mosley was
only the right toSITence, whereas -the
right invoked in the initial int errog at ion
in this case was the
more-difficult-to-waive right to counsel.
That coincident ally happens to be very
true, but it is not the doctrinal hinge on
which Michigan v. Mosley pivoted. The
Supreme Court did not deal with what would
be required properly to resume an
int errog at ion, fol lowing the invocation of
either right, with respect to a sing le
case but went to great le ng ht s to point
out the separate natures of the two
investigations and consequently of the two
interrogations.
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Of critical significance was the fact
that, after Mosley had invoked his right
under Miranda in the first investigation,
the different team of officers
investigating the second crime
scrupulously "restricted the second
interrogation to a crime that had not been
a subject of the earlier interrogation."
Id. at 881 (Citation Omitted).
and the more recent

_______ u.s. ______ ,

Q_r_e_9_o_n__

103

s.

ct. 2830 (1983)

which was a plurality opinion interpreting

do

not apply to the circumstances of the instant case, as well.
In the case at bar, the second interrogation of appellant came
a significant time after his invocation of the right to
counsel and the second interrogation of appellant was
restricted to a crime that had not been the subject of the
first

interrogation.
Furthermore, a recent case from the Supreme Court of

North Carolina makes the point that a defendant's invocation
of his right to counsel for one crime does not automatically
attach to a subsequent interrogation of the accused for
another crime.

This case,

304

S.E.2d 579

(N.C. 1983) differs somewhat from the present case in that
officers questioned the defendant about a a crime (unaware
that he had invoked his right to counsel) and he unexpectedly
confessed to another, unrelated crime.

Without deciding the

issue of whether the officers erred in initiating the
questioning, the court held that the defendant's right to
counsel was not violated when he when he confessed to a crime
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about which there had never been any intent to question him,
and for which he had never requested an attorney.

The court

made the following statement:
It is true that under F.dwards v. Arizona
once a suspected crimina1-1nvokes-h1s __ _
right to counsel, he may not be questioned
further until counsel is provided unless
the suspected criminal himself initiates
the dialogue at which time he may waive
his right to have an attorney present.
However, in the case sub judice, defendant
never invoked his right to counsel with
respect to the Moody (the unrelated) - murder:-Jfe-SpecfficaITy stat-ed-,-pi'Tor to
any-questioning, that he just wanted "to
go ahead and get this over with.
I do not
want a lawyer."
Officer Price further
testified on voir dire that he told
defendant for his best interest he ought
to obtain a lawyer before trial.(Emphasis
added)
Franklin,

held that a defendant does not

insulate himself entirely from any future custodial inquiry
once he has invoked his right to counsel for an earlier and
unrelated crime.

Such a conclusion promotes the interests of

suspects to evaluate their interests with respect to new
charges.

An earlier invocation of right to counsel with

respect to an earlier, unrelated charge does not constitute an
eternal moratorium on a suspect's future exercise of his
perogative when confronted with different allegations on a
subsequent occasion.
When this aspect of E:_r_<:_nkliri_ is applied to the
instant case, it is clear that appellant voluntarily and
intelligently waived his right to counsel after receivinq his
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rights before the detective's forgery interrogation.
Detective Nortz scrupulously honored appellant's
rights and restricted his questions to the new forgery charge.
A defendant should have the affirmative opportunity
to decide with each charge whether he will invoke the right to
silence or to an attorney so long as those rights are
"scrupulously honored" by the custodial authorities and the
subsequent relinquishment of either or both of those rights is
shown to be intelligent and knowing.
An Eighth Circuit case,
(8th Cir. 1974) held that

__

495 F. 2d 3 5

expressly allows the

defendant to waive his right to counsel following counsel's
earlier appointment:
If an accused can voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to
counsel before one has been appointed,
there is no compelling reason to hold that
he may not voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his right to have
counsel present at an interrogation after
counsel has been appointed.
Of course,
the Government will have a heavy burden to
show that the waiver was knowingly and
intelligently made, but we perceive no
compelling reason to adopt the per se rule
advocated by petitioner.
In fact,
expressly recognizes that such
interrogation may continue without
presence of counsel, thouqh the burden of
showing a knowing and intelligent waiver
is a heavy one.
Moore at 37.

Although appellant

in this case testified that he

"could not recall" receiving a second Miranda warning prior to
Nortz's interrogation (H.14), the record is clear that
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appellant not only received a !'!_i_r_a_n_rl_a_ warning

(H. 6), but also

acknowledged that he understoocl it, anrl vnlunt ar i ly consent eel
to talk with Detective Nortz.

Appellant

state that he woulrl

be willing to talk to the officer without having an ilttorney
present

(H.

6).

re-Mirandized.
voluntary and

Significantly appellant

rlirl not deny being

The State has met its burden of showing a
intelligent waiver.

Finally,

has been applied to right to

counsel cases when factually warranted.

Two Wisconsin cases,

Wentela v. State, 290 N.W.2d 312 (Wis. 1980), and Leach v.
265 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1978), applied
through the suspect invoked the right to counsel.
in

even
The court

explained its decision thusly:
The defendant argues that Mosely is
limited to those situationS-1n-wl1ich a
defendant invokes only the right to remain
silent, and that it was expressly not
addressed to the question of whether
statements obtained after a defendant
requests an attorney are a per se
violation of Miranda.
To a degree, the
defendant is correct.
In an explanatory
footnote, the court in Mosley stated, "The
present case does not involve the
procedures to be followed if the person in
custorly asks to consult with a lawyer,
since Mosley made no such request at
anytime:W--Michigan v. Mosley, 423 u.s. at
101, n. 7, 96s-:Ct-:-at3g-:--Nevert he less,
the fundamental concept expressed in
Mosley is that a defendant's exercise of
one of the rights enumerated in Miranda whether it be the right to terminate __ _
questioning or the right to the assistance
of a lawyer-will not prohibit all
subsequent questioing under all
circumstances.
Indeed, it was probably to
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differ with the Mosely majority for
failing to broac'len--lt-s basis of decision
tht Mr. Justice WHITE, in his concurring
opinion, stated:
"Unless an individual is
incompetent, we have in the past rejected
any paternalistic rule protecting a
c'!efendant from his intelligent and
voluntary decisions about his own criminal
case . . . To c'lo so would be to "imprison
a man in his privileges.'"
423 U.S. at
108-09, 96 s.ct. at 329, quoting Ac'lams v.
United States ex rel. Mccann, 317-u:S.--2-69 .--2iro-.-T3-s.-cY.-2:f6-;-Trr:. Ed 26 < 1942>.
Leach at 501.

There is no allegation in the instant

case that appellant is incompetent.

He was therefore quite

capable of choosing not to consult with an attorney prior to
talking with Detective Nortz.
adds further weight to the proposition
that Mosely, _:>upra, may be applied toward both the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel.
Appellant relies heavily upon Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981), for the proposition that once an accused
has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, he is not subject to any subsequent int errog at ion
until counsel has been made available to him.

Edwards,

however, is factually distinguishable from the instant case.
In

the defendant was arrested on one

charge, informec'I of his Miranda rights, and he subsequently
confessed.
differs from the instant case
inasmuch as the lapse of time between interrogations in
was less than 24 hours, the interrogation was
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involuntary, and the second interrogation concerned the
identical topic which had been terminated by the defendant's
specific request for appointment of counsel.

In the instant

case, the interrogations were three months apart, concerned
entirely different subject, and the rights of appellant were
scrupulously honored by the police and voluntarily waived by
him.

Furthermore, in

counsel was not provided to the

defendant; in the instant case, appellant received counsel for
the burglary charges, and three months later, before the
unrelated interrogation, was told he had the right to have an
attorney present, a right he declined to exercise.
factual discrepancies illustrate that

The
is not

directly on point and does not control the instant case.
Another problem with applying

to the instant

case is that the record is unclear as to whether appellant
requested counsel on the prior charge specifically to help him
with all custodial interrogations or for other purposes.
importance of this distinction was made clear in Jordan v.
Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982):
Appellant contends that Miranda as applied
in Edwards requires the suppression of his
recorded confession. We conclude that the
guest ion before the Court in Edwards is
clearly distinguishable from
presented in the case sub judice.
In
Edwards, the Court addressed the issue of
"whether the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require the suppression of a
post-arrest confession, which was obtained
after Edwards had invoked his right to
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The

interrogation."
451 U.S. at 478, 101
-s:-ct-.--at-Ts-81, 68 L.Ed.2d at 382 (emphasis
added).
In the instant case, Jordan never
requested the assistance of counsel with
repect to custodial interrogation; he
merely told the judge that he would like
appointed counsel to assist him in further
judicial proceedings.
In Edwards, the
expressed desire to deal wTth-tne police
only through counsel was made to the
police during a custodial interrogation
session.
Unlike Edwards, Jordan never
"invoked his right_t_o have counsel present
during custodial interrogation" or
"expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel." Moreover,
he expressed no reluctance to speak with
his interviewers, and he never attempted
to cut off quest ion i ng .
Id. at 1073.
omitted)

(Emphasis added in the original, footnotes

In discussing the reasoning behind this distinction,
the court drew on the following anaysis:
[S]ome defendants may well wish to have an
attorney to represent them in legal
proceedings, yet to wish to assist the
investigation by talking to an
investigating officer without an attorney
present.
"While the suspect has an
absolute right to terminate station-house
interrogation, he also has the prerogative
to then and there answer questions, if
that be his choice." To hold that a
request for appointment of an attorney at
arraignment would bar an investigating
officer from later finding out if
defendant wishes to exercise the
prerogative would transform the Miranda
safeguard, among which is the right to
obtain appointed counsel, "into wholly
irrational obstacles to legitimate police
investigative activity, and deprive
suspects of an opportunity to make
informed and intelligent assessment of
their interests."
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Id. at 1073 and 1074.

Adoption of appellant's blanket

interpretation of request of counsel would actually inhibit a
defenc1ant 's right to make c1ecisions for himself, lessening his
role in his own trial.
Since it is unknown whether appellant maae a
specific request to have an attorney present at the custodial
interrogation, his claim is impossible to consider.

To

assume, without knowing, the purposes for which appellant
invoked his right to an attorney would diminsh rather than
enhance his rights.
The inapplicability of
particular

to the

circumstances in the instant case,

becomes more evident
in 9regon v. Bradshaw

in light of the Court's recent decision

u.s.

I

103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983).

Bradshaw's plurality opinion, following a review of its
holding in

stated:
[there] we held that after the right to
counsel had been asserted by an accused,
further interrogation of the accusea
should not take place "unless the accused
himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversation with the
police."
451 u.s. at 485, •

Bradshaw at 2834.
Justice Rehnquist

then explained that even after

the accused has initiated a conversation with the police
following his invocation of the right to counsel, "the burden
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events
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indicated a waiver of the .
during the interrogation."

right to have counsel present
Id.

The plurality in

agreed with the trial court's finding that the police
had committed no imrropriety but instead had properly advised
the defendant of his rights and the defendant, having
understood those rights, knowingly waived them.

Id. at 2835.

Significantly, Justice Powell, concurring in
stated that, he did not agree with the plurality's apparent
adoption of a

rule which requires a two-step analysis

(1) whether the accused has "iniated the dialogue with the
police following a request for counsel; and

( 2) whether a

knowing waiver has occurred via the Zerbst standard.
28 3 6.

Id. at

Just ice Powel 1 observed:
The Zerbst standard is one that is widely
unde-rs-t-ooo and fol lowed.
It al so comports
with common sense.
Fragmenting the
standard into a novel two-step analysis if followed literally often would
frustrate justice as well as common sense.
Courts should engage in more substantive
inquires than "who said what first."
The
holding of the Court in Edwards cannot in
my view fairly be reduceato this.
Id. at
2838.(Footnote omitted).

Justice Powell agreed with the

plurality that once an

accused has invoked his right to counsel he is certainly
entitled to additional safeguards.

Id. at 2838.

The central

question of whether he has waived the right however is
uniquely one of fact that should be determined by the totality
of the circumstance in each case. Id. at 2838.
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(Footnote 4).

In the instant case, since there existed no
initation by appellant neither _E:_d_w_a_r_d_s_,
supra apply.

Under

and

s_ur_r_a_ nor

its prcxieny,

it

Bradshaw,

---------

is clear that

appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right
to counsel, and that the police who conducted this
interrogation, committed no impropriety.
Even assuming

that

it does not necessarily provide a

were applicable,
se rule that an attorney

must be present every time an accused talks with police.
court notes in Footnote 6 p.

The

48fi of Edwards that "[v]arious

decisions of the courts of appeal are to the effect that a
valid waiver of an accused's previously invoked Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is possible."
overruled.

The Court goes on to quote from

Rodriguez - Gastel um,

u.s.

These cases are not

5 69 F. 2d 48 2, 48 6, cert_:_

4 36

919 (1978):
it makes no sense to hold that once an
accused has requested counsel, he may
never, until he has actually talked with
counsel, charge his mind and decide to
speak with the police without an attorney
being present.

The Court in

supra rejected the

invocation of a per se rule on this issue, holding that the
requirements must be applied with flexibility and
realism.
Appellant also cites Peoyle_.2_·_

48 N.Y.

2rl

167, 397 N.E. 2d 709 (N.Y. 1979) and several other New York
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cases for the proposition that once a defendant

is represented

by an attorney, the police may not elicit further statements
from him.

Appellant maintains that Edwards is based on these

-----

case.

however, is not as extensive in its holding as

these cases because they are based on an interpretation of the
New York, rather than the United States, constitution.

The

New York courts have expanded the right to counsel beyond what
is constitution ally required under Miranda.
The Nebraska Supreme Court confronted a similar "New
York" argument in
1980).

Jackson, 290 N.W. 2d 458 (Neb.

The defendant

in i_ackson,

referring to argued

that the police were precluded from further interrogation in
the absence of counsel once the defendant has invoked his
right to counsel.

In short, the defendant in

supra

argued that once counsel is appointed there can he no waiver
unless the waiver took place either in the presence of counsel
or by counsel.

Id. at 461.

The Nebraska Supreme Court

disagreed and emphatically stated:
for.

1

"

Id. at 461.

"'Miranda does not go that

The court further noted:

There has been little acceptance of the
Arthur rule out side New York.
Even in
that--jurisdiction, there appears to be a
disagreement as to the extent of the rule.
Id. at 461-462.

These cases are therefore also inapposite.

Once it has been established that the interrogation
was proper and appellant waived his right to have counsel
-21-

present, there is no question that the handwritin'J exemplar
was properly admitted into evidence.

Yet appellant contends

that the handwriting sample violates the right not to give
evidence against himself.

Appellant cites

Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980), in support of this proposition.
Hansen, however, was a unique case in which the accused was
ordered by the court to do the affirmative act of writing.
This court stated that "[w]e do not mean this decision to be
understood as going beyond its particular facts."
supra, at 317. The Court reaffirmed its attitude toward
compelling an accused to furnish handwriting samples in State
v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980):
• • • [A] handwriting exemplar requires an
affirmative act and hence, this case goes
beyond making observations or comparison
of an accused's appearance, or his body,
or its parts or substances obtained
therefrom.
(Mccumber at 358, cit at ions
ommitted)
----Hansen v. Owens is inapplicable to the instant case since
appellant voluntarily gave a handwriting sample.
The fact that appellant consented to the handwriting
sample also negates appellant's contention that the police
should have had either a search warrant or probable cause
before obtaining the sample.

Scheckloth v. Bustamante, 93

S.Ct. 2041 (1973) held that one exception to the requirements
of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent.
-22-

Moreover, the idea that once an accused invokes his
right to counsel he cannot be searched or consent to a search
is without merit.

An accused may consent to a search in spite

of the fact that he had invoked his right to counsel because
these are separate rights.

This concept was explained in
515 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

In discussing the relationship between the holding in Edwards
and the holding in Schn_eck1=.._o_!-_!":, the court stated:
Finally, we note the distinction between
the instant case and the Supreme Court
opinion in Edwards v. Arizona.
In that
case the
once a
suspect who is being interrogated invokes
his right to counsel, all questioning and
examination must halt and may not resume
unles the suspect himself initiates the
continuation.
Spec i f ical ly, the Court
said that "it is inconsistent with Miranda
and its progeny for the authorities, at
their instance, to reinterrogate an
accused in custody if he has clearly
asserted his right to counsel."
The Court
was extremely careful to distinguish
between the Miranda rights, so to speak,
of a suspect -and his Fourth Amendment
rights:
"Schneckloth does not control the
issue presentedTn-this case."
What this case impliedly holds is that
it is perfectly proper for the authorities
to initiate inquiry into possible waiver
of a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights
even after he has invoked his right to
counsel.
at 1368; citations omitted, emphasis added).
Appellant's contention is unsound, particularly so when the
case on which he chiefly relies comes to an opposite
conclusion.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant received and unclerstoocl his rights under
Miranda before the police interrcxiated him for a second time.
He was advised of his rights to obtain counsel, yet
affirmatively waived that right.

Appellant claimed he "had

nothing to hide" and agreed to cooperate with the police.
Although appellant

had obtained an attorney three

months earlier, it was for an unrelated charge, and therefore
was far removed from the second interrcxiation by both time and
subject matter.
Furthermore, appellant may waive his right to an
attorney by himself.

He need not obtain the advice of an

attorney in deciding he does not require his assistance.
Indeed,

it is doubtful that an attorney would ever decide for

his client that his client does not need him.
A E_e_i:_ se rule on this issue would only serve to
diminish and not protect the rights of the accused.
Appellant's rights in the instant case were scrupulously
honored by the police and the circumstances clearly show that
appellant had intelligently and knowingly waived his rights
before he was interrcxiated on the forgery charge.

For these

reasons, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
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